Canadian Military History
Volume 2

Issue 1

Article 6

1993

Der Gegenangriff Vor Verrieres: German Counterattacks during
Operation “Spring,” 25–26 July 1944
Roman Johann Jarymowycz
romanj@videotron.ca

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh

Recommended Citation
Jarymowycz, Roman Johann "Der Gegenangriff Vor Verrieres: German Counterattacks during Operation
“Spring,” 25–26 July 1944." Canadian Military History 2, 1 (1993)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more
information, please contact scholarscommons@wlu.ca.

Jarymowycz: German Counterattacks during Operation “Spring”

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1993

1

Canadian Military History, Vol. 2 [1993], Iss. 1, Art. 6

Der Gegenangriff vor Verrières
German Counterattacks during Operation
"Spring": 25-26 July 1944
Roman Johann Jarymowycz
In the area of Panzer Group West the enemy attempted
on the 25th and 26th July with 2 Canadian InfDiv
and 1 Armoured Brigade to penetrate between
Bourquebus and the Orne on a 7 km wide front. After
hard fighting and counterattacks, 1 st SS Panzer
Korps gained a complete defensive victory.

and Operations "Charnwood," "Atlantic" and
"Goodwood," the German formations facing II
Canadian Corps continued to create strong
panzer reserves, but they were seldom the
equivalent of a weak Canadian brigade group
and more often comprised a strongly reinforced
battalion.

Field Marshal von Kluge, 31 July 1944
"Spring": Canadian Plans

T

he Canadian effort in Operation "Spring"
has been well-documented by Canadian
military historians. July 25th is perhaps the
most investigated Canadian operation fought
during World War II.1 The German defense of
Verrieres Ridge was determined— LieutenantGeneral G.G. Simonds' infantry paid dearly for
each yard won. The enemy did not limit itself
to positional defense and blocking tactics. In
the break-in battle, or kesselschlacht, German
doctrine called for counterattacks to be
delivered as quickly as possible:
. . . surprise can overcome the enemy, without the
enemy artillery or air forces having a chance to
intervene. . .It is, therefore, essential to maintain
reserves in at least every battalion sector, which
come forward immediately after the barrage has
ended before the British artillery can register—
unsupported infantry will break. 2

1 SS Panzer Korps delivered counterattacks
at two levels: divisional reserve counterstrokes
(by dedicated kampfgruppes3) and the corps
operational reserve counterattack by the 9th
SS "Hohenstaufen" Panzer Division. Severely
reduced by the heavy fighting throughout J u n e
Opposite: Soldiers silhouetted against gunfire in the
early morning of 25 July 1944 near Fleury-sur-Ome.

L

ieutenant-General Simonds planned
"Spring" as a three-phase operation. The
first phase required the capture of the line
Tilly-la-Campagne—Verrieres—May-sur-Orne.
Phase 2 was the capture of line Fontenay-leMarmion—Rocquancourt.
On successful
completion of Phase 2, ideally at first light,
Simonds would order his armour to push
forward and capture the high ground beyond
Verrieres—"The C r a m e s n i l S p u r " a n d
Cintheaux. With a little luck, a German collapse
and some determined leadership by the
reconnaissance regiments, British armoured
cars could possibly reach the Laison River, if
not Falaise itself, by nightfall.
There was later discussion regarding
Simonds' operational aims. Senior Canadian
officers considered "Spring" a breakout attempt,
but Simonds insisted after the war it was a
"holding attack" 4 designed to draw German
panzer divisions away from Operation "Cobra"
— General Omar Bradley's attack at St. Lo.
The U.S. breakout was also scheduled for 25
July and was supported by what became the de
rigueur opening act for major Allied offensives
in Normandy: massive air bombardment by
heavy bombers.

(Photo by Michael M. Dean, NAC PA 131384)
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Guy Simonds' resources were MajorGeneral R.F.L. Keller's veteran 3rd Canadian
Infantry Division and Major-General C. Foulkes'
relatively green 2nd Canadian Infantry Division.
For armour Simonds had three powerful
formations: the 2nd Canadian Armoured
Brigade (2 CAB), the 7th British Armoured
Division (the "Desert Rats") and the Guards
Armoured Division.5 Simonds was particularly
well supported by indirect fire: the artillery of
the four Canadian and British divisions, as
well as three Army Groups Royal Artillery
(AGRA), for a total of twelve field, nine medium
and three heavy regiments. 6

The Other Side of the Ridge

G

erman defence doctrine adhered to the
three level principle forged during the
waning years of the First World War: a thinly
held forward zone, a center main defence area
and a rear area comprised of reserves ready to
block or counterattack. 7 Verrieres Ridge was
held by two German Divisions: General
Schack's 272nd Grenadier and SS Generaimqjor
Theodor Wisch's 1st SS Leibstandarte Adolf
Hitler Panzer Division (1st SS LAH).

Jagdpanzer V - Jagdpanther
Simonds chose to distribute 2 CAB's
regiments among the 2nd and 3rd Infantry
Divisions. Foulkes and Keller further broke up
their armour and allotted a squadron per
attacking brigade. The brigadiers assigned
their squadrons to the two battalions tasked
with a Phase 2 objective—planned to be
captured at "First Tank Light." As 2 CAB was
distributed throughout the Corps, 7th British
Armoured moved to Ifs and its armoured
component, 22nd Armoured Brigade eventually
concentrated in the area of Beauvoir Farm.
The Guards Armoured Division was moved
into the southern suburbs of Caen, just north
of Ifs ready for the Phase 3 exploitation. It was
never to be used.

The 272nd was one of the three "270" series
raised in late-1943 and sent to France to train.
It was composed of veterans and a varied mix
of Germans and Osten Truppen (Russians and
Poles). The division had spent the last six
months training in the Perpignan area. In its
first battle—Operation "Atlantic," 18-23 July, 8
the 272nd had been roughly handled by the
2nd Canadian Infantry Division but still
deployed three weak grenadier regiments, the
Fusilier Battalion and its Panzer Jaeger
Battalion (towed 75 mm Pak and Marder selfpropelled anti-tank guns). Its artillery was
mostly intact. 9
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The 1 st SS LAH was simply the best German
panzer division in the Third Reich. Its units'
battle honours included the campaigns in
Poland '39, France '40, and Greece '41. It had
fought as a complete division in Russia in
1942-43 and was rebuilding in Belgium when
the Allied invasion of Normandy began. The
LAH had its normal panzer regiment (two
battalions of main battle tanks: one with
Panthers; the second equipped with Mark IVs)
and two infantry regiments (six battalions of
which one was mounted on half-track armoured
personnel carriers). For infantry support the
division had a Sturmgeschutz battalion (Stug
III). To kill armour the LAH had its Panzerjdeger

battalion augmented with a company of the
deadly JagdPanzer TVTank destroyers. 10
Both German divisions were supported by
the artillery of 1st SS Panzer Korps, recently
reinforced by 8th Werfer Brigade. LAH was
also reinforced by the 272nd's Fusilier Battalion
and 101 SS schwer Panzer abteilung (sch Pz
Abt)—an independent Tiger battalion. The
272nd was augmented by three units under
command: the reconnaissance battalion of
10th SS Panzer Division, an infantry battalion
from 9th SS Panzer Division and an armourheavy kampfgruppe from 2nd Panzer Division
which served as the divisional reserve/
77
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counterattack force. If this was not formidable
enough, 503 schPzAbt (Tiger I and King Tiger
lib) was also under command. 11
The left flank was protected by 10th SS
Panzer Division and 102nd SS schPzAbt (Tiger
I) firing from the high ground west of the Orne.
In depth, the operational reserve for 1st SS
Panzer Korps was 9th SS Panzer Division which
had two kampfgruppes available south of
Verrieres directly behind 272nd and 1st SS.
Also available, but under OKW control was the
recently arrived 116th Panzer Division, building
up east of Cramesnil as well as the remainder
of 2nd Panzer Division, south of May astride
the Orne. 12

THE GERMAN COUNTERATTACKS

T

here were three separate counterattacks
during Operation "Spring." Each was
conducted by at least a reserve battlegroup
from one of three panzer divisions: 1st SS LAH;
9th SS Hohenstaujen and 2nd Weiner Panzer.13
It would be difficult to suggest which was the
most effective. Kampfgruppes from LAH and
2nd Panzer savaged the North Nova Scotia
Highlanders (NNS) and destroyed the Black
Watch. The initial 9th SS attack failed to break
Lieutenant-Colonel J.M. Rockingham's Royal
Hamilton Light Infantry (RHLI) or recapture
Verrieres but its left hook totally defeated
Brigadier W.J. Megill's 5th Canadian Infantry
Brigade, recaptured May-sur-Orne, St. Martin,
and the approaches to Hill 67. 14
The German army conducted a battle of
manoeuver. It fought and won under extremely
adverse conditions: total Allied air and artillery
supremacy. It was less Canadian incompetence
than German skill and experience that gave
Kluge ". . .a complete defensive victory."15

supported by tanks or assault guns. 16 Three
Canadian battalion attacks were launched
against these objectives: Lieutenant-Colonel
C. Petch's North Nova Scotia Highlanders
attacked Tilly and were stopped dead. The
presence of the 1st SS appears to have been a
complete surprise, particularly the tanks dug
into the village perimeter.
Petch pleaded with the commander of 9th
Brigade to reinforce him. Brigadier D.G.
Cunningham ordered "B" Squadron from the
Fort Garry Horse (10th Canadian Armoured
Regiment), scheduled to advance with the
Highland Light Infantry during Phase 2, to
move forward and help the Novies.17 The
Canadian Shermans boldly moved forward but
suddenly found themselves in a killing zone.
SS Untersturmfuhrer Gehrard Stiller's 7th
Panzer Company destroyed most of "B"
Squadron in a matter of minutes. 18
Control of Tilly-la-Campagne meant that
the 1 st SS could dominate the Caen—Falaise
highway as well as shoot directly into the flank
and rear of British or Canadian squadrons
trying to maneuver past Verrieres. When the
Royal Regiment of Canada (RRC) attempted to
advance on Rocquancourt, 1st SS Panzer
Regiment sprung its trap. Using Rocquancourt
as the anvil, Panthers and Tigers flanked the
RRC axis of advance and hammered the
supporting 1st Hussar Squadron and the
exposed infantry. 19 This was more properly, a
counterattack by fire.
Further German counterattacks in Tilly
were limited to reinforcing platoons that
attacked and recaptured individual buildings
or walled gardens held by the Novies. Petch's
command, exposed, neither in nor out of the
village, and too close for safe artillery support,
remained locked in close quarter combat until
night.

Counterattacks by 1st SS Panzer Division:
Der Kampf am Tilly

T

he LAH held three of the four key positions
on Verrieres: the stone villages of Tilly-laCampagne, Verrieres and Rocquancourt. Each
was defended by a reinforced company group
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1st SS Counterattacks: Rocky at Verrieres
he RHLI, skillfully commanded by
Rockingham, secured its own start line
and quickly captured Verrieres. The village
was the strategic center of the ridge and the 1st
SS reacted promptly and violently:20

T

Counterattacks began Immediately, causing further
casualties to troops and equipment. Four of our six
pounder anti-tank guns were destroyed by direct fire
from enemy tanks. At one period, three enemy tanks
were In a forward company area before one was
knocked out with a PIAT and the others withdrew. 21

The Rileys were effectively supported by a
troop of 17-pounders Rockingham deployed
forward of Troteval Farm and by the British
22nd Armoured Brigade. Ordered by Simonds

to help the RHLI, the British sequentially
allotted individual squadrons from the 4th
County of London Yeomanry (CLY) and the 1st
Royal Tank Regiment (RTR)22 to operate on the
western flank of Verrieres village and hull
down at the crest line of the ridge itself. The
RHLI held firm.

The Counterattack by 272nd Division:
Kampfgruppe Sterz
eneral Schack deployed the 272nd
Division two regiments up with his depth
regiment holding a reverse slope position
centered on the village of Fontenay-leMarmion, 23 the Black Watch objective in
"Spring."24 Below the ridge, and out of direct

G

Operation "Spring": Counterattacks, 25 July 1944 - 1000 to 2000 hours
79
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Preceeding pages:
Left: This aerial photograph, taken on 7 August
1944, shows the village qfVerrieres. The RHLI
staged a successful defence qfVerrieres against
determined German counterattacks. Just visible at
the top of the photo is the Troteval Farm.
Right: Tilly-la-Campagne is visible at the bottom
left of the photo. At the top is Bourgebus.
(LCMSDS)

observation to C a n a d i a n g u n n e r s , were t h e
self-propelled a n t i - t a n k g u n s a n d Tigers of
5 0 3 r d sch Pz Abt. The division's reserve a n d
c o u n t e r a t t a c k force w a s Kampfgruppe Sterz,
s e c o n d e d from 2 n d P a n z e r Division.
Major Sterz w a s the c o m m a n d e r of
Panzerjdger Abteilung 3 8 , t h e 2 n d P a n z e r
Division's a n t i - t a n k battalion. His kampfgruppe
consisted of t h e 3rd P a n z e r Regiment's leichter
zug (light troop — actually, 4 Mk rVs), a P a n t h e r
company, his own J a g d P a n z e r IV t a n k
d e s t r o y e r s a n d a battalion of p a n z e r g r e n a d i e r s
m o u n t e d in Sd.Kfz 2 5 1 / I s (armoured halftracks) . Sterz's m i s s i o n w a s to c o u n t e r a t t a c k
within Schack's divisional boundaries,
specifically t o r e s t o r e a n y s i t u a t i o n t h a t
t h r e a t e n e d 2 7 2 n d control of M a y - s u r - O r n e
a n d Verrieres Ridge. 2 5

Sterz p o s i t i o n e d h i s light t r o o p u n d e r
OberleutnantP. Prien directly in M a y - s u r - O r n e
a s h i s own v a n g u a r d a n d h a r b o u r e d t h e
r e m a i n d e r of t h e kampfgruppe in Laize-la-Ville,
approximately 2 . 5 k m o r 1 5 m i n u t e s t a n k
driving time away. Although their w a r n i n g
o r d e r c a m e a s early a s 0 5 3 0 h o u r s , t h e
c o u n t e r a t t a c k w a s n o t l a u n c h e d until a r o u n d
0 9 4 5 h o u r s after Prien reported c o n t a c t with
C a n a d i a n a r m o u r ("B" s q u a d r o n , First H u s s a r s ,
c o m m a n d e d by C a p t a i n J.W. Powell) a n d a
b a t t a l i o n of infantry (the Black Watch, u n d e r
Major Phil Griffin), 26 a d v a n c i n g t o w a r d s May.
Sterz r e a c h e d h i s s t a r t line s o u t h of Mays u r - O r n e a t approximately 1000 h o u r s a n d
divided h i s c o m m a n d into t h r e e a s s a u l t groups:
t h e P a n t h e r s left; t h e p a n z e r grenadier battalion
center a n d t h e JagdPanzers on t h e right. 2 7
S u p p o r t e d by 2 7 2 n d divisional artillery a n d
flanking fire from t h e 10th SS sector a c r o s s t h e
Orne, Sterz overran a n d destroyed t h e Black
Watch. 2 8
Sterz c o n t i n u e d by a t t a c k i n g t h e 1 st H u s s a r
S h e r m a n s a n d r e m n a n t s of "B" Company,
Calgary H i g h l a n d e r s w h o were still a t t e m p t i n g
to h a n g on to t h e n o r t h e r n section of May. Both
s u b - u n i t s were driven back. The 2 n d Panzer

A German Nebelwerfer six-barrelled rocket projector.
Allied
troops called it
"Moaning Minnie"
b e c a u s e of t h e
sound of its projectiles.
(CFPU PMR 83-757)
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Captured German armour: Sd.Kfz 251/9 halftrack with 7.5 cm gun (left) and a Stug III.
(Photo by G.K. Bell, NAC PA 114156)

attack continued until it reached "The Factory"
area 29 south of St. Martin, where it lost
momentum in the face of a determined stand
by the surviving platoons of the Calgaries and
Support Company, Black Watch. Bombarded
by heavy artillery stonks, Sterz disengaged at
about 1330 hours. He had stopped 5th Brigade,
cleared May and forced the Canadians to
withdraw; however St. Martin, as well as parts
of "The Factory" were still reported in Canadian
hands. 3 0
The Operational Reserve is released:
The 9th SS Hohenstaufen

T

he Germans quickly appreciated "Spring"
was a major effort by II Canadian Corps.
By mid-morning its apparent success created
serious worry for 1 SS Panzer Korps. Initial
reports indicated that the Canadians had
broken through the HauptKampfLinie (HKL,
the Forward Edge of the Battle Area) and were
on Verrieres Ridge in strength. Serious fighting
was confirmed in Tilly-la-Campagne, Verrieres
and May-sur-Orne. More alarming, British
armour was observed massing for a further
assault. 31

Field Marshal Hans Kluge, commander of
German forces in Normandy, visited the I SS
Panzer Korps that morning and was fully briefed
on the Verrieres situation. He quickly gave
permission to release the operational reserve
and launch the corps counterattack. 32 The
complete order, from Chief of Staff I SS Korps,
Oberfuhrer Kramer to Oberstrumbannfuhrer
Harzer took less than one minute. 33 The 9th SS
i n s t r u c t i o n s were to "attack n o r t h and
reestablish the original HKL."34
The Counterattacks by 9th SS:
Kampfgruppes Meyer and Zollhofer

H

ohenstaufen fielded two battlegroups. The
armour-heavy kampfgruppe, commanded
by Oberstrumannfuhrer Otto Meyer (no relation
to Kurt Meyer of 12th SS Hitler Jugend), was
composed of Panthers and Mk IVs of 9th SS
Panzer Regiment, a panzer grenadier battalion,
a company of engineers and a flak battery. The
infantry-heavy kampfgruppe (the Panzer
G r e n a d i e r Regiment "Hohenstaufen," a
Sturmgeshutz company, and supported by the
bulk of 9th SS Divisional artillery) was
83
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Opposing Forces:
First Canadian
Army Front,
8 August 1944

commanded
by
Oberstrumannfuhrer
Zollhofer.35 Meyer was ordered to advance
"east of Fontenay towards point 88" roughly
the geographic center of Verrieres Ridge.
Zollhofer was tasked to advance "west of
Fontenay towards St. Martin." 36 Both attacks
were launched around 1600 hours.

to his start line (north-east of Fontenay) was
remarkable. Canadian and British observers
reported the German advance 38 and Simonds,
or the Commander of 4th Brigade, it is not clear
who, quickly organized a reverse slope defence.
It included elements of 22nd British Armoured
Brigade, 4th Infantry Brigade, 1st Hussars,
and 23rd Canadian Armoured Regiment.

"Wer die Hohe uberschreitet
ist ein toter Mann!"

As Meyer's panzers crossed the crest they
ran into a well-orchestrated crossfire of 17pounder and 6-pounder anti-tank guns,
Shermans and supporting artillery. Canadian
fire was so deadly that Meyer reported at 1750
hours: "Whoever crosses this ridge is a dead
man!" Undaunted, he swung west to support
Zollhofer's attack 39 against 5th Brigade.

A

lthough the 25th was occasionally overcast, the skies above Verrieres were full of
Allied tank-killing aircraft. Given Simonds'
strength in artillery and total domination of the
sky,37 Meyer's ability to advance from Bretteville
84
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This air photo shows St. Martin-de-Fontenay at the top and "The Factory" area just below it. At the bottom of
the photo is May-sw-Orne.
(LCMSDS)
85
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"Wo ist Zollhofer?"

T

he 9th SS left hook was late getting off the
mark. The Hohenstaufen had considerable
trouble crossing the crest near May and
launching its attack. General Schack's HQ
demanded "Where is Zollhofer?" By 1840
hours the Hohenstaufen kampfgruppe had the
joined battle and had begun to clear St. Martin.
One reason for Zollhofer's delay was that he
had run into a Canadian counterattack ordered
by Simonds. 40
Le Regiment de Maisonneuve was returned
to Brigadier Megill's command and directed to
capture May. The battalion attack began
promisingly enough but soon ran into heavy
flanking fire from 272nd defenders still in St.
Andreas well as 10th SS and 102nd SS Tiger
fire from across the Orne. J u s t as the
Tiger tank pointing

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1993

Montrealers were making progress, they, like
the Black Watch earlier, ran into a German
counterattack: Zollhofer. The Maisies were
forced back to their start line. They were to
remain there until 8 August.
Once the Maisonneuves had withdrawn,
Zollhofer continued his attack through "The
Factory" and into St. Martin. The 9th SS
history credits Zollhofer with reaching the high
ground north of St. Andre. There is some
argument as to the extent of the German
victory. However, Black Watch and Calgary
war diaries confirm that the two battalions
withdrew to Basse and Fleury-sur-Orne, north
of Hill 67, and out of view of St. Martin and St.
Andre. 41 Clearly, St. Martin and "the Factory"
were recaptured and only the original foothold
in St. Andre remained in Canadian hands.

to Bourgebus.
(Photo taken in August 1946 by G. Noble, PMR 82-064)
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Once 9th SS had reestablished the HKL,
major German counterattacks against Verrieres
Ridge ended. 42
"Spring": The Final Results

T

he German tally sheet for "Spring" shows
the following: Tilly was held and would
remain in German hands until 8 August. 43 The
1st SS had lost Verrieres village to the Rileys.
Despite the best efforts of two experienced
German panzer divisions, the Canadians hung
on to the center of the ridge. The 5th Brigade
front was a shambles. The 2nd Panzer
recaptured May; 9th SS recaptured St. Martin
and, according to the Hohenstaufen history,
reached Hill 67. 44 The Calgaries, Camerons
and Black Watch were forced back leaving only
the Regiment de Maisonneuve clinging to St.
Andre, which they never quite controlled: "Le
28 juillet le Batalion recevait l'ordre de nettoyer
completement le village de Saint-Andre. La
compagnie a reussi a s'approcher de Feglise,
toujours infestee d'Allemands." 45
For the Germans, the battle for Verrieres
was a doctrinal success. They had given II
Canadian Corps a bloody setback. "Heirbei
hatte der Feind hohe blutige Verluste. "46 Quick
counterattacks succeeded except in the one
area where Simonds ordered 22nd Armoured
to support Rockingham. If "Spring" was indeed
planned as a "holding attack" it appears to
have failed. Before 25 July there were seven
p a n z e r divisions and three heavy t a n k
battalions 47 deployed within the II Corps zone
of operational influence. After "Spring" there
was only one: 12th SS Hitler Jugend supported
by one weak Tiger company. 48

Attack is fire
counterattacks.

that

advances,

Defense

is fire

that

Auftragstakik
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